Tamar Ben-David

Tamar Ben-David completed her doctorate at the Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where her dissertation developed optimal mechanism design theory for multi-dimensional screening problems with correlated type distributions. The work extended the classical Myerson framework to settings where buyer types are drawn from a joint distribution rather than independent marginals — a technically demanding generalisation requiring linear programming over measure spaces and a refined virtual valuation analysis adapted to the non-independence case. She subsequently held a postdoctoral position at the Toulouse School of Economics, working on Bayesian persuasion and information design and developing a geometric characterisation of optimal signals for a sender whose choice of information structure determines an irreversible receiver action.

Her subsequent research addressed incentive-compatible revelation mechanisms for public goods under budget constraints and for settings with interdependent values, where the boundary between mechanism design and social choice theory becomes technically consequential. A parallel programme examined Bayesian persuasion with multiple receivers and correlated information, establishing conditions under which a sender can exploit belief correlations to improve upon outcomes achievable under independent persuasion — a result with direct implications for central bank communication and sovereign debt issuance. The mathematical foundations across both lines of work draw on measure theory, convex duality, and the geometry of feasible belief distributions over type spaces.

At IADU, Ben-David applies mechanism design and information economics to the sovereign and institutional policy settings that define the Institute's applied research programme. Her work examines optimal information disclosure for sovereign debt issuers, incentive-compatible frameworks for central bank forward guidance, and the mechanism design foundations of procurement contracting in public-sector environments. She contributes to the rigorous mathematical specification of principal-agent and information design components across IADU's quantitative policy research output.